Constructing international security : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /
by Benson, Brett V.Description: xiii, 207 pages ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9781107027244 (hardback); 9781107658196 (paperback).Subject(s): POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General | Security, International
|Item type||Location||Call number||Status||Date due|
Epoka University Library
|JZ 5588 .B46 2012 (Browse shelf)||Available|
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.
"Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments"-- Provided by publisher.
"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security order. Experts have long understood that leaders looking to secure allies face a critical tradeoff between strengthening their prospective ally to deter challenges to it while simultaneously refraining from making the ally too aggressive. The author explains how and when leaders can balance these tensions by building commitments that contain conditions and ambiguity"-- Provided by publisher.