Normal view MARC view ISBD view

Constructing international security : alliances, deterrence, and moral hazard /

by Benson, Brett V.
Description: xiii, 207 pages ; 24 cm.ISBN: 9781107027244 (hardback); 9781107658196 (paperback).Subject(s): POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General | Security, International
Contents:
Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.
Summary: "Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments"-- Provided by publisher.Summary: "This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security order. Experts have long understood that leaders looking to secure allies face a critical tradeoff between strengthening their prospective ally to deter challenges to it while simultaneously refraining from making the ally too aggressive. The author explains how and when leaders can balance these tensions by building commitments that contain conditions and ambiguity"-- Provided by publisher.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Add tag(s)
Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
Item type Location Call number Status Date due
Books Books
Epoka University Library
JZ 5588 .B46 2012 (Browse shelf) Available

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Machine generated contents note: 1. Understanding the design of security commitments; 2. A typology of third-party commitments; 3. Time consistency and entrapment; 4. Evidence of moral hazard in military alliances; 5. A theory of commitment design; 6. Testing the implications for alliance design; 7. Deterrent commitments in East Asia; 8. Constructing security in today's world.

"Constructing International Security helps policy makers and students recognize effective third-party strategies for balancing deterrence and restraint in security relationships. Brett V. Benson shows that there are systematic differences among types of security commitments"-- Provided by publisher.

"This book explains when and why state leaders form different types of security relationships such as ambiguous alliance agreements. These differences are important because commitments, such as formal military alliances and extended deterrence threats, form the basis of the international security order. Experts have long understood that leaders looking to secure allies face a critical tradeoff between strengthening their prospective ally to deter challenges to it while simultaneously refraining from making the ally too aggressive. The author explains how and when leaders can balance these tensions by building commitments that contain conditions and ambiguity"-- Provided by publisher.

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Epoka University Library, Rr. Tiranë-Rinas,Km. 12 1039 Tirana, Albania
+355 4 2232 086| FAX +355 4 2222 117|library@epoka.edu.al