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035			_a(OCoLC)ocm44915377
040			_aUKM _cUKM _dC#P _dDLC
042			_alccopycat
050			_aHC79.I5 _b.M845 2001
090			_aHC 79.I5 .M845 2001
100			_aMule, Rosa.
245			_aPolitical parties, games and redistribution / _cRosa Mule.
260			_aCambridge ; _aNew York : _bCambridge University Press, _c2001.
300			_axiv, 255 p. : _bill. ; _c23 cm.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 213-243) and index.
505			_aMachine generated contents note: Introduction -- Welfare state expansion and retrenchment -- The argument of this book -- Comparative strategy -- The Luxembourg Income Study -- The structure of the book -- X Political parties, games and income redistribution -- Traditional redistributive games: median voter, political business cycle -- and partisan model -- Advances in the theory of party politics -- Party goals: trade-offs and priorities -- Party competition: arithmetical particularism and Director's Law -- Party organisation: pivotal players, strategic disagreement, sequential -- elections and correlated strategies -- Conclusion: political slack and redistributive policies -- 2 Opposition effects, blackmail and u-turns under -- Pierre Elliot Trudeau -- Political background -- Social deavages and redistribution -- Electoral incentives for redistribution -- The New Liberals and expansionary policies -- Why the guaranteed annual income proposal failed -- The NDP challenge and the 1971 unemployment scheme -- The blackmail game -- The u-turn -- Income inequality: demography, markets and income transfers -- Conclusions -- 3 The arithmetics of politics under Margaret Thatcher -- Political background -- Electoral incentives for redistribution -- Explicit games and the antiegalitarian crusade -- Sequential elections -- Breaking the internal alliance on social security policies -- Income inequality: demography, markets and income transfers -- Conclusions -- 4 Right-wing ascendency, pivotal players and asymmetric -- power under Bob Hawke -- Political background -- Electoral incentives for redistribution -- Political renewal shapes social policies -- The Centre-Left as a pivotal player in redistributive games -- Two-stage game over redistributive policies -- The acquiescence of trade unions: consensus or imbalance? -- Asymmetric bargaining and social security reforms -- Income inequality: demography, markets and transfer policies -- Conclusions -- 5 The demise of the federal social safety net under Clinton -- Political background -- The evolution of policies towards low-income groups: electoral and -- institutional determinants -- Strategic disagreement and the stalemate of welfare reform, 1992-I994 -- The Paternalistic-Deterrence game -- 'Deserving and undeserving poor' -- Conclusions -- 6 Conclusions -- Comparative analysis -- The redistributive logic in liberal democracies -- Distributive elites, institutional context and opposition effects -- Comparing redistributive games -- Reassessing the party-policy link -- The future of redistribution -- Technical addendum -- Bibliography -- Index.
650			_aPolitical parties.
650			_aIncome distribution.
856			_uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy02/2001269495.html _3Table of Contents
856			_uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/description/cam022/2001269495.html _3Publisher description
856			_uhttp://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam031/2001269495.html _3Sample text
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955			_ato SSCD ps02 05-30-01 _cse03 2001-09-06 _ese01 01-09-10; To Dewey; Copy 2 to BCCD sa55 01-17-02
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